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INTRODUCTION
Herbicides are  an important production input for  farmers in the United
States and in Minnesota.  Between 1965  and 1975,  national sales of
herbicides rose by 13%  per year.  By 1986,  annual use  of herbicides was
over  579 million pounds  in the United States  (Swanson and Dahl,  1989).  In
Minnesota,  the acres  treated with herbicides doubled between 1972 and 1980.
In 1980,  95%  of all corn acres  in Minnesota were  treated with herbicides,
and nearly 23 million pounds of herbicide active  ingredients were applied
to  corn in Minnesota (Hanthorn, et al.,  1982).
Concern for the environmental effects of herbicides and other
agricultural chemicals has grown along with their use.  Several pesticides
have been banned,  and restrictions have been placed on the use of many
others.  The adverse effects of herbicides on the health of farmers,  farm
workers  and consumers of agricultural products has become increasingly
controversial.
In  the early 1980s,  concern focused on the appearance of herbicides
and other agricultural chemicals  in ground water.  In response  to
increasing concern over the potential for ground water contamination,  the
Minnesota Department of Agriculture and the Minnesota Department of Health
tested private and public drinking water wells  for the presence of
herbicides and other pesticides.
Fifty-one percent of the private wells and 28%  of the public wells
tested positive.  Fifteen pesticides were detected.  Thirteen of the  15
1were herbicides,  1 was an insecticide  and 1 was a wood preservative.  The
herbicide,  atrazine, was found in over 90%  of the wells that tested
positive for the presence of pesticides.  Another herbicide,  alachlor was
found in 10%  of the wells testing positive  (MDA, 1988).
These studies were focused on wells with higher probabilities of
contamination, and  all  the detections were below Recommended Allowable
Limits. The frequency of contamination was,  nevertheless,  larger than
expected.
These results  stimulated concern and interest in alternative policies
to  control or prevent the  continued contamination of ground water supplies
with herbicides and other agricultural chemicals.  One  such policy,  or
rule,  would be a regional ban of alachlor and atrazine  in the ten counties
of  southeastern Minnesota.  There are,  at least,  four reasons why such a
policy is  of particular interest.
First,  atrazine and alachlor are by far the most common pesticides
detected in Minnesota ground water.  Both are important corn herbicides.
Atrazine  is particularly susceptible  to  leaching, and the health effects of
alachlor are under debate.
Second,  the well testing by the Minnesota Departments  of Agriculture
and Health has made it clear that certain regions are more susceptible
than others to ground water contamination from herbicides.  Southeastern
Minnesota, with its karst geology,  and central Minnesota with its coarse,
drift aquifers are particularly sensitive to contamination from normal
agricultural use of herbicides.  Targeting herbicide restrictions  to  those
areas most sensitive  to contamination could dramatically reduce  the cost of
the restrictions,  and hence increase net benefits  from the policy.
2Third, regional  targeting of pesticide management  is  in keeping with
recently promulgated policies  of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
The EPA strategy for managing agricultural  chemicals envisions a
predominant  role for state agencies.  The strategy explicitly defines  a
"differential protection approach",  that  is,  targeting protection efforts
on sensitive or particularly valuable ground water supplies  (EPA, 1987).
Finally, a regional ban of selected herbicides is  the most
restrictive of suggested policy options.  An analysis  of the economic,
environmental and institutional effects  of  this most restrictive policy
will serve  as  a baseline to  compare other possible policy options.
Given this interest, we  analyzed the effects of three hypothetical
herbicide bans  involving alachlor and atrazine in southeastern Minnesota.
The hypothetical bans are:  1) banning atrazine,  2) banning alachlor, and 3)
banning alachlor and atrazine  together.  The analysis  is based on farm
level economic  impacts  and the environmental impacts of the  three regional
herbicide bans.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Many studies have attempted to assess the economic  impact of
restricting the use of inputs for agricultural production.  Relatively few
of these  studies focus on restricting of specific herbicides used in corn
production, and even fewer focus on the  farm level impacts of such
restrictions.
Cashman, et al.,  1980, analyzed the impacts on a representative  600
acre  corn and soybean farm in Indiana of restrictions on herbicide use.
Two herbicide restrictions were modeled:  a ban of all acetanilide
3herbicides  (alachlor, metolachlor, propachlor) and a ban of all triazine
herbicides  (atrazine, cyanazine,  simazine).  A linear programming  (LP)
model was used to simulate the production process  of the representative
farm.  Likely substitutes  to  the banned herbicides were determined by
consulting weed scientists  and extension agents.  The yield of specified
substitutes was estimated based on plot trials.  The  optimal solution was
constrained to one of the evaluated substitutes.
The acetanilide herbicide ban resulted  in a yield loss of 4 bushels
per acre  (2.6%).  Variable costs per acre declined by $5/acre  (4%),  but the
drop  in variable costs was not enough to  offset lower yields,  thus net
returns per  acre dropped by $4/acre  (1.6%).  Slightly greater  impacts
occurred with  the triazine herbicide ban,  as  the  yield loss  was 5 bushels
per acre  (3.3%).  Variable costs per acre declined after the ban by $4/acre
(3.2%),  while net returns per acre fell by $8/acre  (3.2%).
Delvo, 1971, analyzed the farm level impacts  of herbicide
restrictions  for three hypothetical scenarios.  The base situation was weed
control accomplished by pre-emergence herbicides and cultivation.  The
second scenario postulated a ban of all pre-emergence and pre-plant
herbicides, leaving only post-emergence herbicides  and cultivation for weed
control.  The third scenario postulated a ban of all herbicides,  leaving
only cultivation to accomplish weed control.
Delvo estimated the  impacts of these restrictions on a 400 acre
dryland farm,  and a 600 acre  irrigated farm in Nebraska.  Yields were
assumed to  fall by 12%  if all pre-emergence herbicides were banned, and by
23%  if all herbicides were banned.  Returns  to  labor and management were
used as  the metric of profitability.
4The estimated returns to  labor and management were between $1,900 and
$7,70.0  before any bans.  If pre-emergence and pre-plant herbicides were
banned, returns fell  to between $550 and $1.700.  When all herbicides were
banned, returns became negative.
Several authors used larger LP models  to  estimate  the welfare changes
if herbicides were banned nationally.  Osteen and Kuchler,  1986 and 1987,
used a national model of crop prices,  production acreage,  crop rent and
economic surpluses  to  estimate the effect of national bans on corn
herbicides.  Four scenarios were  evaluated:  ban alachlor,  ban all
acetanilide,  ban atrazine, and ban all  triazines.  The  effect of the bans
on yield,  and the probable substitutes for the banned chemicals were
derived from questionnaires  sent  to  representative weed scientists  across
the country.
The higher production costs and lower yields resulting from the bans
were offset by increased commodity prices  induced by lower national
production of corn.  Consequently,  the bans brought about increases  in net
returns per acre.  Both users and non-users of the restricted herbicides
gained from herbicide restrictions on corn.  However,  the authors stressed
the need to assess  the order in which herbicides were restricted, and
suggested that evaluating possible restrictions one chemical at a time
might lead to undesirable effects as  more and more chemicals were banned.
Similar results were reported by Burton and Martin,  1987,  who
evaluated the  impact of national bans  on corn and soybean herbicides.  Corn
yields were assumed to drop by 2% if atrazine was banned and by 25%  if all
herbicides were banned.  Production costs were expected to  rise by
$4.61/acre if atrazine was banned,  and by $14 .61/acre  if all herbicides
5were banned.  They found that changes  in consumer and producer surpluses
were small  if atrazine was banned alone, but that producer surplus
increased by 5.7%,  and consumer surplus decreased by 0.3%  if all
herbicides were banned.
Kania and Johnson,  1981,  simulated the effect on the national market
of national bans  on  selected pesticides, and used a regional linear
programming model of a crop production area in Nebraska to  assess the
impact of such restrictions on a local production region.  They assumed no
yield decreases  in Nebraska,  if atrazine was banned,  and a decline  in
production costs.  Product prices were estimated to  increase due  to
national reductions  in corn production.  The combination of no yield loss,
decreased production costs and price  increases  resulted in 2.5%  increase in
producer surplus  if atrazine was banned.  The  authors cautioned that their
results were very sensitive  to estimated yield effects.
Taylor and Frohberg, 1977,  estimated the welfare effects  of erosion
controls  and input restrictions on a national  level.  They estimated yield
losses of 19%  if all herbicides were banned in corn production, consumer
surplus reductions of over $3.5 billion, and increased producer surplus of
$1.8  billion.
Finally, Gianessi, et al.,  1988,  evaluated the effects of a regional
ban of all triazines  in the Chesapeake  Bay area.  They found there was no
effect on market prices of corn or other commodities,  so  that  the effects
of the regional ban were restricted to changes  in producer surplus.  Costs
were estimated to increase by $7.50  to  $12.50/ac,  and yield losses were
between 0 and 16.8%,  depending on local practices.  Yield and cost
estimates were based on discussions with local extension and experiment
6station personnel.  These changes in costs and yields cause regional
producer surplus  to drop by $4 to $70 million.  No farm level impacts
were reported.
THEORY
The effect of herbicide restrictions is  illustrated in Figure 1.  The
y-axis represents yield,  and the x-axis  the expenditure on weed control.
The yield response  to weed control  involves  a pair of response functions
such as  Fgw and Fbw  in the  figure.  A pair of response  functions  is needed
to represent each weed control  treatment since weed control  is  affected by
weather.  The function Fgw represents yield response  to weed control  if the
weather is  good for weed control,  while Fbw represents  the yield response
in weather not suitable for weed control.1 Larger expenditures on weed
control  are required in weather not suitable  for weed control  to achieve
the  same yield as  in good weather.
The effect of an herbicide ban is  to  shift the pair of response
functions  from Fgw to  Flgw, and from Fbw to  F1bw.  This  shift down and to
the right reflects  the use  of weed control substitutes  that are less
effective,  or more expensive,  or both.  The vertical distance between Flgw
and Fgw reflects lower yields at  the same expenditure  for weed control in
good weather following the ban.  The horizontal distance reflects  the
increased cost required to maintain yields at the  same level  as before the
1 Good weather for chemical weed control is  defined as  more than .5
inches of rain in the week after the herbicide application, so  there is
sufficient water to move the herbicide into  the  soil.  Good weather for
mechanical weed control is  defined as  less  than .75  inches  of rain in each












Response  Functions of  Three Weed Control Options
8ban.  The vertical distance between response functions under good and bad
weather,  i.e.,  Fgw and Fbw, for a given treatment is  a suggestion of the
risk involved in using that  treatment.
In Figure  1, F1gw shifts down and to  the right the  same distance  from
Fgw as Flbw shifts  from Fbw.  That is,  the vertical distance between the
pair of functions before the ban is  the  same  as  the distance between the
pair of functions after  the ban.  This means  the risk of yield losses  due
to weather is  the same both before and after  the ban.  Clearly,  this does
not have to be the case.
Figure  2 illustrates  other possible shifts.  The substitute,  F2 ,
performs nearly as well in good weather as  the  original treatment, F, used
before the ban, but its performance is very poor in bad weather.  The risk
of yield losses during bad weather is much greater for this treatment  than
for  the treatment used before  the ban.
The substitute F3 performs about as  well  in bad weather as the
treatment used before the ban, but performs  less well  in good weather.  The
risk of yield losses in bad weather,  as measured by the  difference between
yield in good and bad weather,  is  actually smaller for this alternative
than for the treatment before the ban.
It is  also possible to  imagine an average response  function.  This
response  function would lie somewhere between the response  functions for
good or bad weather,  and would represent the weighted average yield
expected for any weed control expenditure, with the weights being the
probabilities of a good or bad weather event.  Such weighted average
response functions are not shown in Figures  1 and 2.
Large losses  in weighted average yields  suggests that the weed control
9substitute performs poorly in weather bad for weed control,  and that there
is  a high probability of weather induced failure of weed control.  If the
probability of weather  induced failure  for the substitute  is high,  the
difference in weighted average yields between the substitute  and the banned
chemical will be larger  than the difference  in yields between the  two
alternatives  in bad weather.  The converse will be true if the probability
of weather induced failure  for the substitute  is quite  small.  Such results
were,  in fact,  found in the analysis of weed control alternatives  described
below.
One can imagine many different hypothetical pairs of response
functions,  each pair representing a possible substitute  to  the weed control
treatment used before the ban.  The  important thing to note  is  the producer
must consider yield,  cost and risk when choosing a substitute.
MODEL
The producer is  assumed to maximize profits represented by the
following function:
MAX  P[F(X,W)]  - C(X)
where X is a vector of inputs, W is  a vector of weather variables,  F is  the
response  function for the farm firm,  and C is  the cost  function.  All
inputs except those relating to weed control are fixed.
If all  inputs except those used for weed control are fixed, then F
becomes a model relating weed control to yield.  This model has  three
parts.  The  first part relates weed control inputs  to a weed density in the
field while the second part relates weed density to  yield.  A full account
10of the construction of these  two parts of the model can be found in Cox,
1989.
The  third part of the model relates weather to weed control,  and it is
the most difficult part  to estimate.  The amount and timing of rainfall
alters the effectiveness of both chemical and non-chemical weed control,
and therefore alters yield.  To  estimate F, a  vector of states of nature,
defined in terms of precipitation, and the yield expected in each of these
states of nature is  needed.  In addition, the probability of occurrence of
each state of nature is  needed.  Then given some assumptions on the  risk
preferences of the  producer,  an optimal solution to  the problem might be
found.
Empirically,  only two states of nature are defined given present
data.  These are estimates  of yield in good and bad weather for weed
control.  Yields  in any  intermediate state of nature are not known.  Thus
the response  function is evaluated at only two points.
The weighted average yields are calculated based on yields  in good and
bad weather,  and the probabilities of good and bad weather occurring.  Such
weighted average yields, however, should not be  interpreted as  the yield
expected in average weather.  The characteristics of the response  function
at such  intermediate points  are not known.
The  cost  function is estimated by constructing a representative farm
and evaluating enterprise budgets for that farm using alternative weed
control treatments.  The representative farm is  assumed to contain 300
acres of continuous corn.  Three tillage systems are analyzed:
conventional, reduced and ridge tillage.  Ridge tillage has the highest
returns over variable costs of the  three systems, but is  not as  yet widely
11used in the study area.  Conventional and reduced tillage'systems  are
quite.  similar in their responses to herbicide bans, consequently only the
results for the conventional  system are reported here.  A full account of
all three tillage systems analyzed can be found in Cox,  1989.
Enterprise budgets are constructed for each tillage system.  All
costs except those relating  to weed control are held fixed.  The
representative farm uses a pre-emergent application of atrazine  and
alachlor before any hypothetical herbicide bans are  imposed.  No change in
tillage system,  or rotation is allowed,  since the physical data needed to
model the effect of rotation changes on weed control are not available.
Because of this restriction in the flexibility of a producer's response,
the results must be interpreted as worst case estimates.
Four decision rules are used in  this  study to  simulate producer's
decisions:
1)  The producer decides to maintain the  same yield in both good and
bad weather as before  the ban, and pays  the extra cost of weed
control required to maintain yields.
2)  The producer decides to maximize profit assuming good weather and
ignores the possibility of bad weather losses.
3)  The producer decides  to maximize profit assuming bad weather.
4)  The producer decides  to maximize weighted average profit, with
the weights being the probabilities of good and bad weather.
These decision rules are used to choose substitutes to  alachlor and
atrazine  following a hypothetical ban of either or both herbicides, with
returns over operating costs used as  the measure of profit.
12FARM LEVEL EFFECTS OF BANS
A pre-emergent application of atrazine and alachlor is  the optimal
choice for  the representative farm before any hypothetical bans  are
imposed.  This choice  is optimal  since it produces  larger profits in both
good and bad weather than any other weed control alternative and has a
smaller risk,  as measured by the difference between yield in good and bad
weather.  If either atrazine  or alachlor is banned,  there  is  no other
alternative that maximizes profit in good and bad weather,  and minimizes
risk.
This means  the  farmer must trade off yield,  cost and risk when
choosing an alternative to either atrazine or alachlor.  The magnitude of
the effects of the ban on any particular producer will depend on how he/she
makes these trade offs,  that is,  which decision rule  is  used to choose a
weed control  substitute.
Effects of an Atrazine Ban
Returns over operating costs  fall if atrazine  is banned regardless of
which decision rule producers  use to  respond to  the  loss of atrazine
(Table 1).  Returns  fall by $7.73/ac in both good and bad weather if
producers decide  to maintain the  same yields as before the ban, or  if they
decide  to maximize profit in bad weather.  In both cases,  producers
substitute cyanazine for atrazine, and add a second cultivation to maintain
weed control.  The  losses in returns are due  solely to  the increased cost
of the  substitute herbicide and the increased tillage cost of the added
cultivation since yield is unchanged.
13TABLE 1
LOSSES  IN PER ACRE RETURNS
OVER OPERATING COSTS DUE TO HERBICIDE BANS
LOSSES  LOSSES  LOSSES IN
TYPES OF BAN AND  IN GOOD  IN BAD  WEIGHTED
DECISION RULE  WEATHER  WEATHER  AVG.  RETURNS
-------------- per acre  ----------------
I. Ban Atrazine
1. Same yield  $ 7.73(3%)  $ 7.73(4%)  $ 7.73(4%)
2. Max.  Prof. Good Weather  0.51(0%)  20.56(10%)  27.18(11%)
3. Max. Prof. Bad Weather  7.73(3%)  7.73(4%)  7.73(4%)
4. Max. Average Profit  7.73(3%)  7.73(4%)  7.73(4%)
II.Ban Alachlor
1. Same yield  2.64(1%)  2.64(1%)  2.64(1%)
2. Max. Prof.  Good Weather  0.10(0%)  20.14(10%)  7.71(3%)
3. Max. Prof.  Bad Weather  2.64(1%)  2.64(1%)  2.64(1%)
4. Max. Average Profit  2.64(1%)  2.64(1%)  2.64(1%)
III.Ban Both
1. Same yield  9.53(3%)  9.53(5%)  9.53(4%)
2. Max.  Prof.  Good Weather  0.51(0%)  20.56(10%)  27.18(11%)
3. Max. Prof.  Bad Weather  9.53(3%)  9.53(5%)  9.53(4%)
4. Max. Average Profit  11.62(4%)  71.76(35%)  7.81(3%)
Producers  can reduce these losses by choosing to maximize profit in good
weather by substituting pendimethalin for atrazine and substantially
increasing mechanical weed control.  Losses  in good weather are  then only
$0.51/ac.  Again, the losses with good weather are due only to  increased
weed control  costs.  However, producers using this decision rule are
exposed to  losses of $20.56/ac or a 10%  drop in returns if  the weather  is
unsuited for weed control.  Yields drop with bad weather by 8 bus/ac due  to
inadequate weed control.  Losses  in average returns are even larger if
producers use this decision rule to choose a substitute since  the
probability of unfavorable weather is high.
Losses  to producers are very similar if they use either reduced or
ridge  tillage instead of conventional tillage.  The atrazine ban does not
14change the relative profitability of alternative tillage  systems;  ridge
tillage remains  the most profitable system, followed by reduced and
conventional tillage.
Effects of an Alachlor Ban
Producers also  suffer losses  in returns over operating costs  if
alachlor is banned regardless of which decision rule  they use  to  respond
to  the ban.  If producers  choose to maintain the  same  yields  in good and
bad weather as  before the ban,  they lose $2.64/ac in both good and bad
weather.  The losses  in returns over operating costs are  the  same if
producers  respond to  the ban by maximizing profits  in bad weather.  These
losses are due solely to  increased cost of weed control and are much
smaller than those  if atrazine  is banned, because of a very close
substitute  for alachlor.  Producers can simply substitute metolaclor for
alachlor with no  added cultivation or other tillage changes.  The added
cost of metolachlor  is minimal, but could go up substantially due to  price
increases once alachlor is banned.  This happened when Canada banned
alachlor.
Metolachlor is very similar chemically to alachlor and it is  possible
that metolachlor would be banned along with alachlor.  If both chemicals
are banned,  the effect on costs  is greater.  For example,  the losses in
returns for producers deciding to maintain the  same yields  in good and bad
weather as before  the ban are  $5.18/ac.  The greater cost is  due both to
the  substitution of a more expensive herbicide, and the need to  shift from
pre-emergent applications  to pre-plant applications with added tillage
costs.
15As with the atrazine ban, producers can substantially reduce per acre
losses  in good weather if alachlor is banned by using a substitute  that
maximizes profit in good weather and ignore the possibility of bad
weather.  Losses  in returns for producers using this decision rule are only
$0.10/ac when the weather is good for weed control but during bad weather,
losses jump  to $20.15/ac.
The  losses in returns due  to an alachlor ban are very similar if
producers use reduced or ridge rather than conventional tillage.  An
alachlor ban does not affect the relative profitability of  tillage systems.
If both alachlor and metolachlor are banned, however,  there  is no
substitute that will maintain the  same yields  in both good and bad weather
as before the ban with ridge tillage.  The relative profitability of
tillage systems  then depends on which decision rule producers use to
respond to the loss  of alachlor and metolachlor.  Banning both alachlor and
metolachlor might  induce shifts  in tillage systems from ridge to  reduced or
conventional tillage.
Effects of an Atrazine and Alachlor Ban
The losses in returns over operating costs are larger if atrazine and
alachlor are banned together than  if they are banned individually.
Producers suffer losses regardless of which decision rule they use to
respond to the ban.
When the same yields are maintained in good and bad weather as before
the ban, losses  in returns over operating costs are $9.53/ac.  The  losses
are the same  if the decision rule  is  to minimize losses  in bad weather.
Producers using either of these two decision rules substitute cyanazine
16for atrazine and metolachlor for alachlor and add a second cultivation to
maintain weed control.  The losses are due solely to  increased cost.
If producers decide  to respond to  the ban by maximizing profits in good
weather  and ignores  the possibility of bad weather,  they can reduce
losses in good weather  to  $0.51/ac, but only by being exposed to  losses of
$20.56/ac during bad weather for weed control.  Again, losses in average
returns are even larger for the producer using this decision rule,  since
the probability of bad weather is  relatively high.
If producers decide to  respond to  the atrazine and alachlor ban by
maximizing weighted average profits,  they will shift to a weed control
regime using no herbicides.  Losses  in average returns are then only
$7.81/ac.  The losses  to a producer using only mechanical weed control are
very large if the weather  is bad, but the probability of bad weather events
for mechanical weed control  is quite small relative  to bad weather for
chemical control,  and hence losses on average returns are relatively
small.
The representative farm constructed for this study is  constrained to
continuous  corn.  The producer is not allowed to change rotations  in
response  to the herbicide bans.  In addition,  the weed control and yield
model used overestimates yield losses when weed densities  are high, meaning
that  the estimated yield losses  for a non-herbicide weed control  regime  in
bad weather are over-stated.  This suggests that  the no herbicide option
may be a more viable alternative than estimated here for a producer with
the financial  stability to  accept occasionally large losses during bad
weather for weed control.
17The losses  from an atrazine and alachlor ban for conventional tillage
are similar  to those for either reduced or ridge tillage.  An atrazine and
alachlor ban does not produce any incentive to shift tillage systems.
Ridge tillage remains the most profitable system, followed by reduced and
conventional tillage.
If metolachlor should be banned along with alachlor and atrazine,  the
losses a producer suffers  are  larger than the atrazine and alachlor ban.
Producers lose $12.91/ac  if  they try to  maintain the  same yields as before
the ban.  Again these larger losses are due to more expensive herbicide
alternatives and the need to  shift to pre-plant incorporation with its
greater  tillage costs.  The  relative profitability of  tillage systems
depends on the decision rule producers use  to respond to  the ban, and on
the weather.  In some cases producers may be better off shifting from ridge
tillage to  reduced or conventional tillage.
Comparison of Bans
The hypothetical herbicide bans  studied differ from one another in
their effects on the representative farm in systematic ways.  Bans
involving atrazine have  the largest effect on costs.  There are no patent
restrictions  on atrazine,  and generic products  are available.  This means
atrazine  is  the least expensive pre-emergent broadleaf herbicide available.
Substitutes for atrazine require more expensive chemicals, more mechanical
weed control,  or a shift  to both pre-emerge and post-emerge applications.
All of these changes  in tillage and application increase costs.
Bans  involving alachlor are less  costly.  There  is  a perfect
substitute,  in terms of yield impacts,  which is  only slightly higher in
18cost.  This substitute  requires no  change in application and no increased
mechanical weed control.
The relative effect of a ban on profit, measured by returns over
operating costs per acre,  is complicated by the  fact that returns depend on
both cost and yield changes,  and yield depends on both  the decision rule
used and the weather experienced.
Still,  the herbicide bans can be ranked for conventional and reduced
tillage by increasing  losses as  follows:
1. ban alachlor
2. ban alachlor and metolachlor
3. ban atrazine
4. ban atrazine and alachlor
5. ban atrazine,  alachlor and metolachlor
In ridge tillage,  the picture  is not as  simple.  If the acetanilides
are banned, all substitutes available  to producers  in ridge  tillage have
lower yields in bad weather than before the ban.  This means  that the
relative effect of herbicide bans  on producers using ridge tillage depends
on weather.  In good weather,  the ranking of the bans is  the  same as that
for conventional and reduced tillage given above.  In bad weather,  a ban
on acetanilides creates  larger losses  than bans of atrazine,  alachlor or
atrazine  and alachlor together.
The hypothetical bans  do not change the relative profitability of
tillage systems  if atrazine,  alachlor or atrazine and alachlor are banned.
Ridge tillage remains  the most profitable  system, followed by reduced and
conventional tillage.  If the metolachlor  is banned along with alachlor or
in combination with atrazine,  the relative ranking of tillage systems
depends on weather and the substitute selected.  This reflects  again the
19fact that banning alachlor and metolachlor exposes  the ridge till producer
to greater risk of losses in bad weather no matter what substitute is
selected.
Sensitivity of Results
Profit, and hence the effects of herbicide bans  on farmers,  are much
more sensitive to changes  in yield and corn price,  than to  changes  in weed
control costs.  A five percent change  in costs  of the representative farm
results  in only a 3% change in the estimated effects of herbicide bans on
returns.  A five percent change in yield or price of corn, however,  results
in a nearly ten percent change in the  estimated effects of an herbicide ban
on returns.
The estimation of yield losses  due to herbicide bans  is  the most
uncertain  factor in the model used to estimate the effect of herbicide bans
on producer profits.  It  is  quite possible that the estimated yields may
be  in error by more than 5%.  This means  the  loss estimates may well be in
error by more than 10%.
Losses  in bad weather due to herbicide bans are the most important
effect of herbicide bans.  Since the representative farm is  constrained in
its  response  to herbicide bans  to simple substitutions of herbicides  and
tillage,  and since the weed control and yield model tends  to overestimate
losses  in bad weather,  the results should be viewed as worst case losses.
Changes in average returns over operating costs are sensitive  to  the
assigned weights;  in this study,  the weights are the probabilities of good
and bad weather events.  Any changes  in the estimated probabilities of good
20and bad weather events will have  important effects on the estimated effects
of a herbicide ban on average returns.
Herbicide Bans  in General
This  study reveals  several important characteristics of estimations  of
the effects of herbicide bans on producers.  First,  most weed control
regimes perform similarly if  the weather is  favorable for weed control.
It  is performance of weed control  regimes when the weather is  unfavorable
that distinguishes one weed control regime from another.  The major effect
of the herbicide bans  analyzed is  to  increase  the risk of  losses  in yield,
and/or increases  in the costs of weed control when the weather is
unfavorable for weed control.  If producers can get  into their fields at
the appropriate time,  they can successfully substitute mechanical  for
chemical weed control.  When there  is adequate  rainfall to move herbicides
into the  soil before weeds germinate,  the  substitution of one herbicide for
another has little effect on yield.  However,  if the weather is
unfavorable,  then particular herbicides perform better than others,  and the
substitution of mechanical  for chemical weed control  is  much more
uncertain.  It is under these conditions  that the  loss  of one  or more
herbicide options  is most clearly felt by producers.
Second,  as mentioned above,  weed control cost increases are dwarfed by
losses due  to declines in per acre yields.  It  is  the estimation of these
yield losses  that is most critical to the estimation of the  impact of
herbicide restrictions.  Surprisingly,  the technical information available
to  estimate such yield losses  is poor.  Most agronomic  studies have focused
on the relative performance of one herbicide compared to  another as
21measured by percent weed control.  The effect of different levels of weed
control on yield has not been estimated.  Much more agronomic  research
focusing on the effect of weed density on yield, and on the relative
performance or alternative weed control regimes on yield needs  to be
conducted before better estimates of the impact of herbicide restrictions
can be made.
Third, the more flexible the response to weed infestations,  and the
more flexible  the response to herbicide restrictions,  the smaller is  the
impact of  any herbicide restriction.  Producers who can change their
rotations  and cropping patterns  in response to weed problems  or herbicide
restrictions can substantially mitigate the  effect of a restriction on the
use of a particular herbicide.  Additionally, a producer who can make weed
control decisions  in stages  during the  season,  that is,  can respond in a
timely fashion to any particular weed problem,  can respond more flexibly to
an herbicide restriction.  A producer who  is prepared to make  split
applications of grass and broadleaf herbicides, and to make timely
substitution of mechanical for chemical weed control, when the weather
reduces  the herbicide effectiveness,  can reduce the losses  due  to any
herbicide restriction.  Modeling this kind of flexible response  is
difficult, and requires more detailed information about  the relationship
between weather, weed control and yield than is presently available.
Finally, it  is clear that the  number of herbicides restricted at any
one time has dramatic effects on the magnitude of the  impacts on producers.
This  is particularly important when restrictions eliminate most of the
available herbicides for a particular weed problem.  For example, banning
both alachlor and metolachlor greatly reduces the herbicide options
22available for grass weed control in corn and,  therefore requires a shift
from pre-emerge to  pre-plant incorporation with concomitantly increased
costs.
ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS
The probability of  a particular herbicide leaching into the  ground
water depends on the nature of the  soil on which it  is  applied and on the
chemical properties of the herbicide.  Substitutes may be more,  less or
likely  to  leach as  the herbicides they replace.  In this  study,  the  soil
type to which these herbicides are applied is  assumed to be constant;
that is,  the bans are assumed not  to  change the fields used to produce
corn, no  land  is  taken out of production,  and there  is  no crop
substitution.  Thus,  the environmental effect  of the herbicide ban will be
dependent on the relative  leaching potential of the weed control
substitutes for atrazine and alachlor.
Leaching Potential
The propensity of a particular herbicide to leach is  determined by its
solubility in water,  its persistence,  and the strength with which it
adheres  to  soil particles.  The greater  the solubility of the herbicide in
water,  the greater the probability that the herbicide will be carried by
percolating water out of the root zone and into ground water.  The greater
the persistence of the herbicide, measured by its  half-life in the soil,
the greater the probability that  the herbicide will end up in ground or
surface water.  Herbicides that break down quickly have much less chance of
moving into the subsoil.  Finally, herbicides that become strongly
23attached to soil particles are much less likely to move with percolating
water.  Soil  sorption is measured by the Koc value.  The higher the Koc
value,  the greater the attachment to soil particles.
These three herbicide characteristics  (solubility,  half-life and
adherence) have been integrated to rate  the leaching potential of each
herbicide  (SCS,  unpublished).  The leaching potential is  "the  tendency of a
pesticide  to move in solution with water and leach below the root zone into
deep percolation,"  (SCS,  unpublished).  Herbicides  are ranked as having a
small, medium or large  potential to  leach.  These rankings are used to
compare the probability of substitutes  for atrazine and alachlor  leaching
into  ground water.
Table 2 lists the weed control alternatives that are within the
likely set of substitutes if atrazine is banned alone,  or in combination
with alachlor or the acetanilide.  Since atrazine has a large potential  to
TABLE 2
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leach because of its high solubility and long half life,  all of the likely
substitutes have lower leaching potentials  than atrazine.  Therefore,
banning atrazine should reduce the probability of herbicides reaching
ground water.
Environmental effects  are more equivocal  if alachlor is banned.
Table 3 lists  the leaching potential of alachlor and its  likely
24TABLE  3
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substitutes.  Of these  substitutes, only pendimethalin has a smaller
leaching potential  than alachlor  itself.  Pendimethalin enters the  set  of
likely substitutes as  the alternative  that maximizes profit in good
weather.  However,  it carries with it  risk of much greater losses  in bad
weather.  It becomes a more prominent substitute  only if all the
acetanilide are banned,  that is  if metolachlor and propachlor are banned
along with alachlor.  Even then,  the producer would have to be willing to
accept much larger  losses in bad weather to choose pendimethalin over EPTC.
Herbicide Bans and Soil Erosion
Efforts  to control  soil loss have focused on adopting tillage
practices that  leave substantial amounts of crop residue on the  soil
surface.  The residue reduces  the effect of raindrop impact on loosening
soil particles,  and impedes the flow of water over the field.  It  is
possible that measures to  restrict herbicides could cause substitutions
that reduce the amount of residue left on the soil surface,  and thereby
increase the risk of soil loss.
There are  two ways the herbicide restrictions might influence the
amount of crop residue left on the field.  First,  the restrictions might
induce a shift from conservation tillage practices to  more conventional
25tillage practices.  Second,  the restrictions might induce a substitution of
mechanical for chemical weed control within a particular tillage system.
The  shift from a conservation tillage system to a more conventional
system will have the most dramatic  impact on soil losses.  Allmaras,  et
al.,  1985,  estimated the residue remaining on the  soil surface under
various tillage practices.  They reported that  84%  of crop residue remained
under no-till tillage,  32%  under reduced tillage,  and only 8% under
conventional  tillage.  Since crop residue is  critical to  the reduction in
soil  erosion, any herbicide ban that results in shifts from ridge to
reduced tillage,  or from reduced to  conventional tillage would be  expected
to  exacerbate soil losses.
Such shifts in tillage system are likely only  if all the acetanilide
are banned as  a group.  The  results of this  study indicate that a ban of
acetanilides or  of acetanilides plus  atrazine may well induce producers  to
shift  to more conventional tillage practices  in order  to  take advantage of
pre-plant  incorporated grass herbicides.  Bans of atrazine,  alachlor,  or
atrazine and alachlor together,  do not change  the relative profitability of
tillage systems.  It appears  that bans have  to encompass most of the
herbicides available  for a particular weed control  function, in our case,
for grass weed control, before shifts in tillage systems become  likely.
In contrast,  all of the bans studied are likely to  induce some
substitution of mechanical for chemical weed control.  Bans of atrazine
alone or alachlor alone are likely to result  in an added cultivation to
maintain weed control  at pre-ban levels.  The addition of a single
cultivation, however, would be expected to have minimal effects on soil
losses.  Substitutions relying primarily on mechanical weed control  could
26have significant effects on the risk of soil  loss.
Increased risk of soil loss does not necessarily mean increased damage
from soil  loss.  The  actual soil loss  is closely linked to many site
factors,  including slope,  slope length,  and position in the watershed.
Other management factors including rotation, strip cropping,  contouring and
terracing have important effects on whether soil  is  lost or not,
regardless  of the tillage system used.
Interactions with Conservation Compliance
Conservation Compliance regulations may constrain the tillage practice
choice  set of producers responding to herbicide restrictions when the
regulations  go into effect.  The  interaction between Conservation
Compliance and herbicide bans are difficult to predict because of the
complexity of the factors  involved in determining whether a producer  is  in
compliance on any particular field.
Conservation Compliance regulations are not tied solely to  tillage
practices.  Changes  in rotation, strip cropping and contouring will also
satisfy the regulations.  However, two points seem clear.  In southeastern
Minnesota,  continuous row crops with no hay rotation will probably require
some  form of conservation tillage to comply  (Breitbach, 1989).  This means
that producers will be constrained from shifting out of conservation
tillage, in response  to a ban on all acetanilide,  on fields subject to
Conservation Compliance.
Second, farmers using pre-plant incorporated herbicides may have
trouble complying with Conservation Compliance,  especially in continuous
row crop systems  (Breitbach,  1989).  Again, this will constrain the
27substitutions  available to producers on land subject to  Conservation
Compliance if all acetanilide are banned.  A pre-plant incorporated
application of EPTC becomes a likely substitute under such a ban.  This
treatment  is  the only treatment with the  same yields  in bad weather as
before the ban.  Yet because of Conservation Compliance, producers may not
be able to use this  substitute without changing their rotation.
Conservation Compliance  regulations  should not seriously constrain the
choice of substitutes  if alachlor or atrazine are banned alone,  or if
alachlor and atrazine are banned together.
SUMMARY
The major effect of herbicide bans  on producers  is  to  increase the
risk of yield losses  when the weather  is unsuitable for weed control.  This
means that financially stable producers,  that  is,  those able to absorb a
year of lower yields, have much more flexibility in responding to  the ban,
and can reduce the overall  impact of the ban on their profits.  Financially
unstable producers have  less choice in responding to  the ban.  If they must
reduce  the risk of low yields when the weather is unsuitable for weed
control,  then they will have to  settle for lower average returns due to
the herbicide ban.
The  dollar impact on producers depends on both weather and the
decision rule the producer uses to respond to the ban.  Cost increases
range  from $2 to $10  per acre  if the producers  try to maintain the same
yields in both good and bad weather for weed control as before the bans.
Banning alachlor has  the smallest effect on cost;  banning atrazine and
alachlor has the largest effect on cost.
28Cost increases can be substantially reduced if farmers are willing to
accept a risk of larger yield losses when the weather is unsuitable for
weed control.  Cost increases of less than $1 per acre can maintain the
same yields in good weather, but result in losses of 6 to 8 bushels per
acre  if the weather  is unfavorable for weed control.  This  translates into
losses of $20 per acre when the weather is unfavorable.
If producers respond to  the ban by focusing on weighted average
profits,  then losses range from $3 to  $8 per acre.
Banning groups  of herbicides always has a larger  impact than banning
single herbicides.  This  is  especially true  if the ban  includes most of the
herbicides available  for a specific function.  For example,  a ban of all
the acetanilide herbicides,  alachlor,  metolachlor and propachlor,
eliminates most of the herbicides available for grass control  in corn.
Such a ban will require producers to  change from a pre-emerge to  a pre-
plant  incorporated herbicide,  and increase mechanical weed control,  with
attendant cost increases.
Banning atrazine  or alachlor alone or in combination does not change
the relative profitability of tillage systems.  Ridge tillage remains  the
most profitable,  followed by reduced and conventional tillage.  Such bans,
therefore, would not be expected to dramatically increase soil erosion by
shifting producers out of conservation tillage strategies.  If all the
acetanilide are banned,  the ranking of tillage systems  then depends on
both the weather and the decision rule used by the producer.  Such a ban
might create an incentive  to  shift from conservation tillage systems to
more conventional tillage systems.
Finally,  the more flexibility producers have to respond to an
29herbicide ban,  the more they can reduce the impact of those bans on costs
and yield.  If producers can augment chemical weed control with timely
mechanical weed control,  if weed control activities can be sequenced
through the crop year with decisions based on weather and weed populations,
and if the producer can accept a risk of larger losses  in a bad weed
control year,  then they can blunt many of the effects of a herbicide ban.
CONCLUSION
The  intent of an exercise  in policy analysis such as  this one  is  to
help determine whether regional herbicide bans  are good or bad policy.
There are at least  three criteria that can be used to help answer that
question.  First,  will the herbicide bans effectively reduce  ground water
contamination, second,  do the benefits of such bans outweigh their costs,
and third,  do  the bans  result in an equitable distribution of costs and
benefits?  The  results of this  study shed some light on all of these
questions, but unfortunately,  on none  of them conclusively.
Effectiveness
The effectiveness of  the regional bans  in reducing ground water
contamination can be looked at  in two ways.  First,  do the bans result in
herbicide  substitutions that are less  likely to pollute ground water,  and
second, will producers  actually abide by the bans?
Banning atrazine results in substitutions  that are all less likely to
pollute ground water,  as measured by their leaching potential.  The results
are more equivocal if alachlor  is banned.  Two of the three likely chemical
30substitutes  for alachlor have the  same leaching potential as  alachlor.  The
other likely substitute has a  tmaller  leaching potential,  but exposes  the
producer to  risk of greater  losses  in yields  if the weather is bad.  This
substitute  is not likely to  be chosen unless atrazine  is banned along with
alachlor, or  if metolachlor is banned with alachlor.  Banning alachlor
alone would most likely result in more widespread use  of a chemical
substitute with the same  leaching potential as  alachlor.
The  second issue regarding the effectiveness of herbicide bans is
whether producers will abide by the bans.  This issue  is complex  and can
only be summarized here.
Regional herbicide bans have some advantages over other possible
responses  to herbicide pollution of ground water.  First,  the bans could be
enforced by focusing on herbicide  dealers.  Dealers could be made
responsible for verifying sales  to producers within the  affected region.
Such an approach would be similar to  the restricted use herbicide
regulations already in place.  Such an approach means that the  set of
agents  requiring monitoring  is much reduced,  since enforcement can focus on
dealers rather than users  of the banned herbicide.
A ban  is also  simple to understand;  one can either use  or not use  the
herbicide.  This  is an advantage over best management practices,  changes  in
labelling,  or restrictions by soil type which require more information to
implement.
Regional bans  may also be more credible  in the eyes  of both
agricultural producers and consumers of ground water.  It is  important
that producers perceive the ban as  credibly enforceable since the incentive
31to defect from the ban is much greater if producers expect others  to
defect.  It  is  also important that consumers of ground water find the
policy response credible.  Consumers can opt for private solutions by
deepening their wells,  installing filtration equipment or using bottled
water.  The aggregate cost of these private solutions may be much larger
than the cost of a ban.  The worst case would be if consumers  expect the
policy to be unworkable after it  is  imposed and  still opt  for private
solutions.  This would mean that costs would be imposed on agricultural
producers without avoiding costs  of private  solutions imposed on consumers
of ground water.
Benefits  and Costs
The list of agents potentially affected by a regional herbicide ban
includes:  producers that use  the banned herbicide, producers that do not
use the banned herbicide, herbicide manufacturers, herbicide dealers,
custom herbicide applicators, consumers of ground water,  consumers  of
surface water,  and consumers of corn.  It  is clear  that the largest losers
are producers that use the banned herbicide,  and the largest gainers are
the regional consumers of ground water.  Since,  this study focused on
estimating the losses to users of the banned herbicides the gains and
losses to others are purely speculative.  Additional research is needed to
provide estimates of benefits from a regional ban on selected herbicides.
Equity
The distribution of costs and benefits resulting from a regional
herbicide ban depends upon the underlying structure of rights.  Presently,
32producers have the right to  use the offending herbicide without concern for
contamination of ground water and can impose  the costs of contamination on
consumers of ground water.  The effect of a ban is  to  reverse the
structure of rights,  giving consumers the right to  impose costs on
producers.  The decision on whether the distribution of costs and benefits,
after a ban is  imposed,  is equitable,  is a decision on which structure of
rights  is equitable.
It  is often proposed that the most equitable solution is  to adopt a
mechanism that allows both producers and consumers,  that is,  both gainers
and losers,  to  share the  costs and benefits of the policy change.  Since
the major effect  of an herbicide ban is on risk,  one  is  tempted to  suggest
an insurance scheme to  compensate producers  for losses  incurred because of
the ban.  Contributors  to  the  insurance pool could include both producers
and consumers.  The moral hazard problem looms large  in such a proposal,
but such a scheme would provide a mechanism for consumers and producers to
share the  costs of a regional herbicide ban.
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